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1 Overview
This paper gives completeness theorems for some basic reactive Kripke models and
semantics. This section will
1. Introduce reactivity
2. Discuss and compare the kind of Kripke semantics we get with reactivity
3. Explain the challenges in obtaining completeness theorems
1.1 Fibring and reactivity
Our starting point is an ordinary Kripke model for modal logic. This has the form
m = (S, R, a) where S is a nonempty set of worlds, a ∈ S is the initial (actual) world
and R ⊆ S × S is the accessibility relation. The model also has an assignment h,
giving for each atomic q a subset h(q) ⊆ S.
We shall focus on R.
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Let us look at how the modality ♦ is evaluated at a point t ∈ S. This is done by
clause (∗1)
(∗1) t  ♦A iff ∃s(tRs and s  A).
Let us write (∗1) slightly differently, stressing which model we are using
(∗2) t  ♦A in the model m = (S, R, a) iff for some s ∈ S such that tRs we have
s  A in m.
Clause (∗2) can be changed to a fibring clause. Suppose we associate with every s ∈
S, a new Kripke model ms = (Ss, Rs, s) and we modify (∗2) to be (∗3) for a fibred
modality ♦F (see [7]).
(∗3) t  ♦F A in m iff for some s ∈ S such that tRs, we have s  A in ms.
Figure 1 describes the situation.
We switch evaluation at s from the model m to the model ms.
In a way this is a kind of multimodal logic with models of the form n = (S, Rs, s ∈
S) and the jump operators Js, s ∈ S and the modality ♦. Evaluation is two dimen-
sional as follows:
(∗4) t s ♦A iff for some u, tRsu and u s A
t s Ju A iff t u A
According to (∗4) the modality of (∗3) can be written as
(∗5) t s ♦F A iff for some u, tRsu and u s Ju A.
Note that public announcement logic (see references [1, 15]), reference [1] con-
tains material on reactive public announcement logic is an example of this kind of
operator. It has modalities of the form ♦A, where A is a wff such that t  A holds.
The truth condition is:
(∗6) t  ♦A B in (S, R) iff t  B in (SA, R), where SA = {x | x  A}.
The question to ask now is how does ms relate to m?
model m
•
t
s
model m s
Fig. 1 Evaluation of modality at a point
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In reactive logic, we focus on Rs being a variation of R, obtained by switching
on and off accessibility connections in R. If we denote (x, y) ∈ R by x → y then the
basic reactive unit is the double arrow
(x → y)  (u → v).
The reading of the double arrow is as follows. If you traverse the connection x → y,
then send a signal and switch (on or off) the connection u → v. Using a family R of
double arrows, we can move from one Rs to another Rs′ .
We now explain how reactivity can work in the next subsection.
1.2 Reactive Kripke models
Reactive Kripke models were introduced in 2004 [3] and an expanded version
published in [5].
There are various options for kinds of reactivity
Example 1.1 (Reactive Kripke models) Consider the Kripke model of Fig. 2. For
the moment ignore the double headed arrow in the diagram. If R denotes the
accessibility relation then we have in this model aRc, aRb , cRd, b Rd, dRe. Let us
try and evaluate a  ♦♦⊥.
For this to hold at a we need a path aRx, xRy and y  ⊥. Such a path is not
available at this model.
Now let us look at the double arrow from the arc (a, c) to the arc (d, e). This double
arrow is decorated with the minus sign. We read its meaning as saying disconnect the
accessibility dRe if you pass through the arc (a, c). Thus if we get to d through the
path aRb ∧ b Rd then dRe holds. However, if we get to d through the path aRc ∧
c
d
e
b
a
−
Fig. 2 A reactive Kripke model
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cRd, then by the time we get to d, dRe does not hold. So in the reactive model of
Fig. 2, where the double arrow is active we have that a  ♦♦⊥ holds because of the
path aRc ∧ cRd.
Thus in a reactive Kripke model the double arrows change the models.
Figure 3 shows what we see at each point depending on the paths. In fact the
Kripke model of Fig. 3 is an ordinary Kripke model where the nodes are paths. We
must remember to give the same assignment to any atom x at points abd and acd.
That is why we encircled them in the Figure.
We have all kinds of possibilities here, for the double arrow. See Figs. 4 and 5
1. Double arrow to an arc can switch it off (or on), i.e., disconnect (or connect) it.
If decorated with ‘−’ then it switches the arc to off if it is on and leaves it as off
if it is off. If decorated with ‘+’ then it switches the arc on if it is off and leaves it
on if it is on. If not decorated at all then it switches it on if it is off and off if on,
this is called switch reactivity.
2. Double arrow to a point can delete it or can tell us to ignore it or tell us to skip it.
So for example in Fig. 4, if point d is ignored then at point c the point d is ignored
and so
a  ♦⊥
holds because of c. But we still have
a  ♦♦♦⊥
because we can still pass through d to get to e.
Fig. 3 A Kripke model with nodes as paths
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c
d
e
b
a
ignore
Fig. 4 The use of double arrows
cb
a
d
skip
e
f
Fig. 5 Reactive skip
86 D. Gabbay
If we skip d then at c we see e directly. If we delete d then both d and e are deleted
from the model, because e is now unreachable from point a.
Theorem 1.2 There exist mono-modal logics which are complete for a class of reactive
Kripke frames but are not complete for any class of ordinary Kripke or neighbourhood
frames, see [5], and [4, Section 1].
Example 1.3 (Sample application: deontic logic) See [6, 14]. We model contrary to
duty obligations using reactive Kripke models. See Fig. 6.
There should be no fence (i.e., go to b). But if there is a fence (i.e., you go to c and
because of that only worlds with fence are accessible), then it must be white (do not
go to e, go to d).
Example 1.4 (Sample application: reactive grammars) See [10].
We make a context free grammar reactive by allowing the system to switch rules
on and off as it progresses.
Figure 7 is such an example.
Theorem 1.5 Reactive context-free grammar can generate {anb ncn | n = 1, 2, 3, . . .},
which ordinary CFG cannot.
Example 1.6 (Sample application: reactive automata) See [2].
An automaton is a state transitions system responding to input. We can therefore
change the automaton table as we go along. This will give us a reactive automaton.
See Fig. 8.
ideal world
white fence
non-white fence
a
c
e
d
b
no fence
−
• There should be no fence
• If there is a fence it should be white
Fig. 6 Modelling contrary to duty obligations
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Fig. 7 Reactive grammar
Every reactive automaton is equivalent to an ordinary automaton recognising the
same set of words. So we do not gain in expressive power by going reactive (as we do
in the case of reactive context free grammars) but we do gain simplicity.
Theorem 1.7 Let A be an automaton (deterministic or non-deterministic) with k =∏n
i=1 ki states. Then there exists an equivalent reactive automaton A∗ (deterministic or
non-deterministic, resp) with k∗ = ∑ni=1 ki states.
Example 1.8 (Sample application: networks) See [9, 12, 13]. Figure 9 is an example
of a network. It can be argumentation network, neural network, transportation
network, predator-prey biological network and many more.
Here the double arrows have their own meaning in each network and their
availability greatly enhances the expressive power of such networks.
Example 1.9 (Sample application: reactive proof theory) Figure 10 is an example of
a reactive proof rule.
Rule Rn says that if An1, . . . , A
n
k(n) are available, then we can infer Bn but we need
to activate Rules Dni and deactivate Rules E
n
j .
Fig. 8 Reactive automation
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c
db
a
Fig. 9 Networks
For example Rule Rn can deactivate itself after use, as in linear logic. For reactive
Tableaux, see [4, 8].
Theorem 1.10 See [11]. Every reactive Kripke model is equivalent to an ordinary
Kripke model (S, R,≡) with an additional equivalence relation ≡ satisfying
¬∃xyz(xRy ∧ xRz ∧ y ≡ z)
and vice versa.
Figures 11, 12, 13 and 14 illustrate the need for the condition of the theorem. If
x ≡ y in Fig. 11, we need different paths leading to x and y so that we can fold the
Fig. 10 Reactive proof theory
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Fig. 11 Illustrating conditions for Theorem 1.10
model and make x = y = z, and then one path (leading to x) will see xi as accessible
and the other path leading to y will see the yi as accessible.
We get Fig. 12.
The situation in Fig. 13 does not allow us to have different paths to z = x = y if
we fold x and y together. All we can get is Fig. 14.
1.3 Ternary relations
This section shows that reactive models can simulate a ternary relation and thus
relevance logics and conditionals A ⇒ B can be translated into a reactive modality
. A ⇒ B = def(a ⇒ B). This also means that the classical modal reading of
Fig. 12 What we need to fold
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Fig. 13 We cannot fold
t  A → B as t  A implies t  B is too poor to bring out the reachness of reactive
Kripke models and we need something A ⇒ B reading first evaluate A and then
evaluate B.
So t  A ⇒ B iff whenever we evaluate t  A in the model and the model changes
as a result of the reactivity and we get a new model, then t  B holds in the new
model.
Example 1.11 (Reduction of three place relation to reactive binary relation) This
example shows how relevance logics, whose semantics requires a three place relation
ρ(x, y, z) can be simulated using a reactive binary relation R.
We have for relevance A ⇒ B the following truth condition
x  A ⇒ B iff ∀yz(ρ(x, y, z)and y  A imply z  B)
The idea is very simple. Consider ρ(x, y, z) as a binary relation between the pair
(x, y) and the points z. This we can represent in Fig. 15
Fig. 14 Reducing Fig. 13
Completeness theorems for reactive modal logics 91
Fig. 15 Representing a ternary relation
In Fig. 15, we know that (x, y) is related to z because as we go from x to y, we
activate the connection y → z. We also know that (x, y) is not related to u because
as we go from x to y we cancel the connection y → u.
Assume ρ(x, y, zi) holds but ρ(x, y, v j) does not. Let  + be an activating arrow
from the arc x → y to all the zi and  − be a deactivating arrow from the pair x → y
to all the v j.
The model is written as (S,R, a), where R is now a relation containing arrows
x → y (written (x, y) ∈ R), and double arrows (x → y) ± (u, v), written as
+((x, y), (u, v)) ∈ R or −((x, y), (u, v)) ∈ R.
a is a {0, 1} function on arcs giving the active arcs and a(x,y) is updated from a and
R according to the ±((x, y)(u, r)) ∈ R.
a(t,s) is modified from a as follows:
• a(t,s)(β) = 1 − a(β), if [+((t, s), β) ∈ R and a(β) = 0] or [−((t, s), β) ∈ R and
a(β) = 1].
• a(t,s)(β) = a(β) otherwise.
Thus when we pass from x to y, we activate only those zi such as ρ(x, y, zi) holds.
Thus if A ⇒ B denotes the binary relevance or conditional connective whose
semantics involves the ternary relation ρ(x, y, z) and  represents a reactive modal-
ity, then we translate
A ⇒ B = def.(A → B)
We expect that for every model (S, ρ) of ⇒ there exists a model (S,R, a) of , such
that for every A, B and t ∈ S and h we have
t h A ⇒ B in (S, ρ, h) iff t  (A ⇒ B) in (S,R, a, h).
The translation of ρ(x, y, z) suggested in Fig. 15 is not good enough. Consider the
case of 2 points x, y and assume we have exactly ρ(x, x, x) and ρ(x, y, y)
Figure 16 shows our proposed implementation
From x we go to x. We cancel all paths from x to points z such that ¬ρ(x, x, z) and
connect all paths to z′ such that ρ(x, x, z′) holds. So after going from x to x we are
now at x again and we have no connection to y.
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Fig. 16 Better representation of a ternary relation
So let us evaluate at x the formula of relevance implication A ⇒ (B ⇒ C).
x  A ⇒ (B ⇒ C) iff ∀zz′((ρ(x, z, z′) ∧ z  A implies z′  B ⇒ C).
In our case we need to check the cases of ρ(x, x, x) and ρ(x, y, y). Figure 16 shows
that in both cases the relation works OK, but we have to evaluate now x  B ⇒ C
and y  B ⇒ C (assuming x  A and y  A hold).
But we cannot continue correctly because the diagram has changed. What we need
is to go back to the initial position!
To implement ρ(x, y, z), we need to do the following:
1. As we move from x to y, we connect y only to {z|ρ(x, y, z)}. Call this action as
‘making sure that λzρ(x, y, z) is correct for (x, y)’.
2. If we continue now from y to z we do not want to activate the action described
in (1) for (y, z), i.e., we do not want at this stage to ‘make sure that λwρ(y, z, w)
is correct for (y, z)’, we just want to get to z. So in (1) while we are dealing
with λzρ(x, y, z), we deactivate all actions for λwρ(y, z, w). This requires double
arrows of order 2.
3. As we actually pass through y → z, we reactivate all actions for λwρ(y, z, w).
We therefore propose to translate ρ(x, y, z) as in Fig. 17.
In this figure, ρ(x, y, z) and ¬ρ(x, y, u) and ρ(y, z, v) and ¬ρ(y, z, w) hold.
Given a relation ρ ⊆ S × S × S, we simulate (S, ρ) by a model (S,R, a) built as
follows.
Let a(x, y) = 1 for all (x, y) ∈ S × S. Define R as follows:
(1.) S × S ⊆ R
(2.) +((x, y), (y, z)) ∈ R if ρ(x, y, z) holds, for all x, y, z
(3.) −((x, y), (y, z)) ∈ R if ∼ ρ(x, y, z) holds, for all x, y, z.
(4.) if ρ(x, y, z) holds and ±ρ(y, z, w) holds, then by (2) above ±((y, z), (z, w) ∈ R
(respectively).
We add to R also −((x, y), ((y, z), (z, w))) ∈ R and also +((y, z), ((y, z),
(z, w))) ∈ R.
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Fig. 17 Even better representation of a ternary relation
Now consider the relevance truth condition in a model (S, ρ, t) with a ternary ρ
for the relevant A ⇒ B. It is
(*) x  A ⇒ B iff ∀yz(ρ(x, y, z) ∧ y  A imply z  B).
Consider now the evaluation of (A → B) at x at a reactive model (S,R, a, x)
(**) x  (A → B) iff for all y such that (x, y) ∈ R and a(x, y) = 1 (i.e., for all
arcs x → y which are active), we have y  A → B holding at the model
(S,R, a(x,y), y) where a(x,y) is the updated activeness function.
We continue:
(***) y  A → B iff whenever y  A then for all z such that (y, z) ∈ R and is
a(x,y) active we have z  B in the model (S,R, a(x,y,z), z).
To have both definitions (*) and (**) and (***) to be the same we need ρ(x, y, z) to
hold iff a(x,y)(y, z) = 1.
Indeed, this is what Fig. 17 and items (1)–(4) show.
So we have the following:
1. Given a reactive frame (S,R, a) the relation ρ(x, y, z) defined by (a(x,y)(y, z) = 1
gives us a relevance frame (S, ρ). We have for A ⇒ B = def(A → B) that
x  A ⇒ B iff (**) + (***) hold iff (*) holds for ρ.
2. We have also seen that given (S, ρ) , if we define (S,R, a) as in (1)–(4), we can
simulate ρ.
Thus the translation of A ⇒ B as (A → B) is faithful.
The interesting aspect of this example is that axioms on ⇒ become genuine axioms
on the reactivity of a Kripke frame.
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2 Introducing the logic KR, reactive modal K
We have two options for defining the reactive counterpart of modal K.
Option 1 Use only the modality which triggers the double arrows. Let us denote by
∅A and its possibility by
PA = ¬  ¬A.
We have studied completeness theorems for such systems in [11].
Option 2 Study modal K with both  and P and the ordinary  and ♦. We call this
system KR. It has more expressive power and more applications, see [4, 14].
This paper deals with Option 2. The reactivity we used is switch reactivity.
2.1 Introducing and discussing the reactive semantics
Definition 2.1 (Reactive K model)
1. Let S be a non-empty set. A reactive relation on S has the form
R = R1 ∪ R2
where R1 ⊆ S2 and R2 ⊆ S2 × S2 such that the following holds
((x, y), (w, z)) ∈ R2 → (x, y) ∈ R1 ∧ (w, z) ∈ R1.
(This means R2 ⊆ R1 × R1).
We can represent the elements of R1 as ‘x → y’ and the elements of R2 as
‘(x → y)  (w → z)’. The elements of R1 are called arrows and those of R2 are
called double arrows.
2. A function f : R1 → {0, 1} is called an activity function. When f(x, y) = 1 we say
x → y is ‘on’ or is ‘active’ and we write x +→ y. When f(x, y) = 0, we say x → y
is ‘off’ or ‘not active’ and we write x
−→ y.
3. An assignment h is a function giving each atomic q a subset h(q) ⊆ S.
4. A model has the form m = (S, R1, R2, f, a, h) where a ∈ S is the initial world.
Definition 2.2 (Satisfaction) Our language contains the classical connectives
¬,∧,∨,→,,⊥ and the two modalities  and . We define satisfaction in a model
as follows.
1. Let (S, R1, R2, f) be given. Let x
+→ y be in R1. This means that (x, y) ∈ R1 and
f(x, y) = 1. We define f[x, y] as follows:
f[x, y](u, v) =
{
f(u, v) if ((x, y), (u, v)) ∈ R2
1 − f(u, v)) if ((x, y), (u, v)) ∈ R2
2. Given a model m = (S, R1, R2, f, a, h) we define the notion of m  A by induc-
tion as follows:
• m  q iff a ∈ h(q), for q atomic
• m  A ∧ B iff m  A and m  B
• m  ¬A iff m  A
Completeness theorems for reactive modal logics 95
• Similarly for the other classical connectives
• m  A iff for all y such that (a, y) ∈ R1 we have n = (S, R1, R2, f, y, h)  A
• m  A iff for all y such that (a, y) ∈ R1 and f(a, y) = 1 we have n =
(S, R1, R2, f[a, y], y, )  A.
3. The logic KR (reactive K) is defined as the set of all wffs A such that for all
models m we have m  A.
4. Note that we have frames of the form (S, R1, R2, f). The logic is normal, as a and
h can be chosen arbitrarily.
Remark 2.3 Note that the function f introduced in the previous Definition 2.1
actually defines another relation R0 which is a subset of R1. When f changes to f[x,y],
as in item 1 of Definition 2.2, then equivalently R0 changes to R0[x, y]. We use the
notation with the function f to stress the fact that all reactivity changes arise from
arrow connections from R1.
We now address the task of axiomatising the logic KR. To be able to do that
effectively, let us familiarise ourselves better with KR and its unique features.
Consider Fig. 18.
Let our starting point be a. As we traverse the arc a → b , there are two possibili-
ties.
1. We ignore all double arrows and what they do.
2. We take account of what the double arrows say and what they do.
Let Possibility 1 be formalised by ♦ and let Possibility 2 be formalised by P. So
we can write: a  ♦q to mean traverse from a to the accessible world b and ignore
all double arrows and we can write a  Pq to mean traverse from a to the accessible
world b and take account of the double arrows.
e
a
b
d
Fig. 18 Two double arrows hitting the same arc
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Consider now
a  P♦♦
Here we move from a to b and activate the double arrow which disconnects the arc
d → e. We check:
b  ♦♦
and then
d  ♦
Now the arc d → e is disconnected by a double arrow but as we are evaluating ♦ at
node d and ♦ ignores all double arrows and their effects, as far as ♦ is concerned
d → e is connected and hence d  ♦ holds and therefore a  P♦♦ also holds.
The situation is different with
a  P♦P
Evaluating here takes us to d  P, but P is affected and takes account of double
arrows and so d  P does not hold and hence
a  P♦P
does not hold.
Consider now
a  PPP.
We can go from a to e taking account of double arrows. Moving from a to b
switches the connection d → e off but continuing from b to d switches it on again
and therefore d  P holds.
Note that we cannot evaluate any x  Pq, for arbitrary point x, without knowing
how we got to x and which double arrows we activated along the path.
So asking does d ?P hold cannot guarantee an answer. We need to ask
something like
a
♦−→ b P−→ d ?P
or
a
P−→ b ♦−→ d ?P
or in general
(
x0
M1−→ x1 M2−→ x2 → . . . Mn−→ xn
)
?A
where Mi ∈ {♦,P}.
Note that we need a notion of legitimate sequences. This notion will be formally
defined in Section 2.2 below. Meanwhile, we understand it intuitively. The sequence
a
P−→ b ♦−→ d P−→ e
is not legitimate because by the time we get to d, d → e is disconnected. So to get to
e from d we need to use ♦.
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We thus get a bimodal logic with two modalities ♦ and P with evaluation of for-
mulas depending on paths (x0, . . . , xn) but not ordinary paths. We also need to know
how we traverse them. So our paths have the form t = (x0, M1x1, M2x2, . . . , Mnxn),
where t is a legitimate sequence.
Our task in this section is to find axioms and prove completeness for KR. We
might have thought that it would be useful to consider KR as a bimodal logic with two
accessibility relations RP and R♦, and see what properties they have. The problem
is that the accessible worlds are the same for both relations, the difference being
the way we traverse them. So really our most reasonable option is to consider a
transformed Kripke model where the points/worlds are legitimate paths of the form
t = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mnxn)
such that aR1x1 R1x2, . . . , xn−1 R1xn holds.
Thus we start with
m = (S, R1, R2, a, h)
for example (S, R1, R2, a) is as in Fig. 18, and then transform it to a model
m∗ = (S∗, R♦, RP, (a), h)
where S∗ is the set of all legitimate sequences of the form t = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mnxn)
where aR1x1 ∧ x1 R1x2∧, . . . ,∧xn−1 R1xn.
We define R♦ and RP by
tR♦t ∗ (My), when xn R1 y, and M ∈ {♦,P}
tRPt ∗ ((Py), when xn R1 y and t ∗ (Py) is legitimate.
where ∗ is concatenation of sequences.
Let t  q iff xn  q, for q atomic.
Note that R1 and R2 are replaced by R♦ and RP. R1 is used directly in the
definition of the sequences t which go into S∗ and R2 is used in the notion of
legitimate sequences.
So m is replaced by its transformed model m∗, see Fig. 19.
If we do that we can get a completeness theorem after some hard work. We are
facing three formal tasks:
Task 1: Given a bimodal semantic model m∗ with two binary relation R′ and R′′,
and with an equivalence relation ≡, such as the one in Fig. 19, can we
identify whether it comes from a KR model m such as the one in Fig. 18? In
other words, can we identify when a bimodal model n∗ with an equivalence
relation ≡ is actually a transformed version of another KR model n?
Task 2: Axiomatise the logic K.
Task 3: We need to systematically find corresponding axioms for various conditions
on the KR relation R1. This Task we postpone to a future paper.
Obviously the transformed models will play a part, but we note that the trans-
formed models may not be in the same class as the original model. The lucky aspect
for the case of KR is that such models m∗ are also KR models because KR has no
special requirements on the worlds or the relations.
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Fig. 19 Figure 18 transformed
The unlucky or difficult aspect of using the transformed models as tools is that we
need to uniquely identify paths, and to do that we need nominals or second order
propositional quantifiers or in short we need more expressive power at our service
and such power is not available at KR. So our strategy is to use technical devices
which eliminate the need for nominals.
So much for KR. If we look at Fig. 18 we observe that the model is linear. If
we were to insist on semantics which requires that (S, R1) be linear then looking at
the model m∗ of all legitimate paths gives us a non-linear model. This is not good.
We are getting a model which is not in the correct linear semantics. So how do we
axiomatise the linear case? The answer is that I don’t know yet. For the purpose of
many applications such as modelling contrary to duties, KR is sufficient, see [14]. We
postpone the general theory of reactive modal semantics for dedicated future papers.
We now give you an idea of what kind of axioms we need for KR.
We first note that both  and  (the duals of ♦ and P) are K modalities, satisfying
the interaction axiom (for A not containing any ).
PA → ♦A
To explain what additional axioms we need, consider again Fig. 18 which describes
S and compare with Fig. 19 which describes S∗.
Figure 19 is a tree and so each node gives the sequence leading up to it. The
indicies on some nodes are there to help us talk about them. The actual sequences
have no indices. So (aPb♦d3♦e3) is really the legitimate sequence (aPb♦d♦d).
Since the sequence (aPb♦dPe) is not legitimate, the point d3 is ♦ connected only
to e3 and is not P connected to e.
1This figure describes a bimodal logic model with a set of possible worlds S∗ and with two accessi-
bility relations, as indicated, and an additional equivalence relation ≡ on worlds. The equivalence
relation can be read from the fact that we named in the figure several nodes by the same letter.
When node x is equivalent to node y, we are committed to give the same truth values to atoms at
these nodes.
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We now show you how to get an axiom. The axioms which we get allow us to
retrieve the double arrow from the graph. Since
1. (a♦b♦dPe) is legitimate
and
2. (aPb♦dPe) is not legitimate
we know that there must be a double arrow
(a → b)  (d → e).
Similarly, we identify a double arrow from (b → d)  (d → e) since
3. (a♦b♦dPe) is legitimate
and
4. (a♦bPdPe) is not legitimate.
From this we know that if we use both double arrows, the move d
P−→ e becomes
possible. So
5. (aPbPdPe) is legitimate.
The axiom we get in this case is
Axiom: (1) ∧ (2) ∧ (3) ∧ (4) → (5).
This axiom is not written in the modal language of KR. To express it in KR we
need extra technical manipulation. If we have nominals, i.e., we have names for
worlds, say a¯ names a, b¯ names b , d¯ names d and e¯ names e, i.e., we have
y  x¯ iff y = x,
then we can express the following in the logic KR + nominals:
(*): “(aM1x1 M2x2 . . . Mnxn) is legitimate”
by writing a  α∗ where
α∗ = M1(x¯1 ∧ M2(x¯2 ∧ . . . ∧ (Mn−1(x¯n−1 ∧ Mnx¯n) . . .)
Thus our axiom for Fig. 18 is
α1 ∧ α2 ∧ α3 ∧ α4 → α5.
In general if t ∗ (Py) is legitimate (not legitimate) and t1 and t2 are obtained by
changing a single ♦ into P at each place n1 and n2 respectively and t1 ∗ (Py) and
t2 ∗ (Py) becomes not legitimate (respe. becomes legitimate) then t1,2 ∗ (Py) does
not make any change, where t1,2 is obtained from t by changing both instances of ♦
(at places n1 and n2) into P.
This gives us the general form of our additional axioms. However, as we said, to
express the axioms we need nominals in the language. The challenge is to express
the axioms in KR without the use of nominals, by using some other technical device.
This is indeed what we are going to do now!
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2.2 Manipulating finite bi-modal Kripke models
This subsection prepares the ground for our KR completeness proof. Our strategy
is to construct first a finite bi-modal tree Kripke model for the modalities ♦ and P
and then convert this model to a finite KR model. To achieve this, we need to learn
how to manipulate finite bi-modal Kripke models. This is the task of the current
subsection.
Definition 2.4
1. Let ♦ and P be two modalities. A fintie Kripke model for these modalities has
the form m = (S, ρ1, ρ2, a, h), where S is the finite set of possible worlds, a ∈ S is
the initial root (actual) world and ρ1 and ρ2 are binary relations on S. We require
that ρ1 ∩ ρ2 = ∅. h is an assignment giving each atomic q of the language a subset
h(q) ⊆ S.
2. m is said to be a tree model if (S, ρ, a) is a tree with root a, where ρ = ρ1 ∪ ρ2.
This means that ρ is irreflexive and every node x ∈ S has a unique path (leading
up to it) of the form (a, x1, . . . , xn) such that aρx1 ∧ x1ρx2 ∧ . . . ∧ xn−1ρxn holds
and xn = x.
Since ρ = ρ1 ∪ ρ2 we denote paths also by
a
M1−→ x1 M2−→ x2 −→ . . . Mn−→ xn
where mi ∈ {♦,P} and x M−→ y means
xρ1 y if M = ♦ and
xρ2 y if M = P.
We call the above annotated paths.
We also write
t = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mnxn)
for annotated paths.
3. Let m be a tree model. We define the notion of a level of a node x ∈ S
as follows: Let n be the length of the maximal path in (S, ρ, a), i.e., there
exists (a, x1, . . . , xn−1) such that aρx1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn−2ρxn−1 and for every path
(a, y1, . . . , ym−1) in (S, ρ, a) we have m ≤ n.
Then we define
(a) The pont a is of level n.
(b) If x is of level n − k and xρy then y is of level n − k − 1.
(c) The level of the model m is the level of a.
Note that the level of a node x is n − k where k is its “distance” from the
root a.
Definition 2.5 (Path nominals for bi-modal models) Let m = (S, ρ1, ρ2, a, h) be a
finite tree bi-modal Kripke model. Let δ be a function associating with each x ∈ S,
a formula δ(x) of the bi-modal langauge with ♦,P. We say δ is a system of path
nominals for m iff the following holds:
1. x  δ(x) in m.
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2. Let xρ1 y and xρ1z and y = z hold then δ(y) ∧ δ(z) has no finite tree model
(i.e., they are semantically consistent).
3. If x is of level k then δ(x) has at most n − k nested modalities.
Remark 2.6
1. Note that if a finite model m has a system of path nominals as in Definition 2.5,
then the following holds for any t ∈ S
(a) t  P(A) ↔
∨
s
tρ2s
P(δ(s) ∧ A)
t  ¬P(A) ↔
∧
s
tρ2s
P(δ(s) ∧ ¬A)
(b) t  ♦A ↔
∨
s
tρ1s
♦(δ(s) ∧ A)
t  ¬♦A ↔
∧
s
tρ2s
♦(δ(s) ∧ ¬A).
(c) If M ∈ {P,♦) then we have
t  M(δ(z) ∧ A) ∧ M(δ(z) ∧ B) ↔ M(δ(z) ∧ A ∧ B).
2. Note also that the restriction (3) on δ of Definition 2.5 is not really restrictive
because we have the proposition (*):
(*) If t is of level k then for any wff A there exists a formula A′ with at most
n − k nested modalities such that t  A ↔ A′.
This can be proved by induction on n − k, where n is the level of the model m.
Remark 2.7 Note that the concept of path nominals is intended to identify paths and
not necessarily identify worlds. Consider Fig. 20, describing a model with q = 
everywhere and one modality ♦. We can use the system of path nominals δ as
follows:
We see that δ(b) = δ(d), so these are not the traditional nominals. However δ(b) ∧
δ(c) is not consistent. So the paths
a → c → d
a → e
a → b
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Fig. 20 Illustrating path nominals
can be identified uniquely.
δ(e) = ¬♦
δ(b) = ¬♦
δ(d) = ¬♦
δ(c) = ♦¬♦
δ(a) = ♦¬♦ ∧ ♦♦¬♦
Definition 2.8 Let m = (S, ρ1, ρ2, a, h) be a finite tree model and let δ be a system of
path nominals for m. Let Mi ∈ {♦,P} and let (a, x1, . . . , xn) be a path.
1. Let t = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mnxn) be an annotated path in m. The notation means that
we have aρM1 x1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn−1ρMn xn where
ρM = ρ1 if M = ♦
and
ρM = ρ2 if M = P.
Thus the annotated path t is more specific about how we get to xn.
2. Consider the wff δt (X) defined as
δt (X) = M1(δ(x1) ∧ M2(δ(x2) ∧ . . . ∧ Mn(δ(xn) ∧ X) . . .).
3. Define the modality M′ as follows:
M′ = ♦ if M = P
M′ = P if M = ♦.
4. Let t = (a, M1, x1, . . . , Mnxn). Define t′[ j]1 < j ≤ n to be
t′[ j] =
(
a, M1x1, . . . , Mj−1x j−1, M′jx j, . . . , Mnxn
)
Given a t consider δt′[ j](X). We call this formula a one point change of 
δ
t (X).
5. Let t = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mnxn). Assume xnρ1 y. Then the formula δt (Pδ(y)) is
called a P-test at the point xn.
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b
a
c
Fig. 21 Illustrating Definition 2.8
Remark 2.9 To explain the concepts of Definition 2.8, we consider the following two
figures, Figs. 21 and 22.
The first figure describes a KR model for ♦ and P. The second figure describes
the unfolding of this KR model into a bi-modal tree model for the two modalities ♦
and P.
A path nominal system can be defined on the model of Fig. 22 as follows:
δ(c1) = δ(c2) = δ(c3) = ¬♦ ∧ ¬P
δ(b 1) = ♦δ(c1) ∧ P(δ(c2))
δ(b 2) = ♦δ(c3)
δ(a) = ♦δ(b 1) ∧ Pδ(b 2).
If we are given the model of Fig. 22 together with δ, how can we retrieve the model
of Fig. 22 from the model of Fig. 21?
Fig. 22 Expanding Fig. 21
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As part of the conversion/retrieval process, we need to identify the effects of the
double arrow
(a → b)  (b → c)
which resides in Fig. 21 and has manifestations in Fig. 22, namely that b 2  ¬Pδ(c3).
To achieve such an identification we use the P-test formulas.
We formally want to convert the model of Fig. 22 into a reactive bi-modal model
of Fig. 23 by adding a set R2 of double arrows and an activity function f. We let
R1 = ρ♦ ∪ ρP and let the P and ♦ modalities traverse all connections of R1.
Obviously, adjustments are needed!
The end result we hope is a model equivalent to that of Fig. 21.
1. Consider the formula
 = ¬P(Pδ(c3) ∧ δ(b 2))
and consider  ′
 ′ = ♦P(δ(c3) ∧ δ(b 2))
We have a   and a   ′, namely the value changed when we changed P to ♦!
This invites (a → b 2)  (b 2 → c3) ∈ R2.
2. Similarly, consider
ϕ = ♦(δ(b 1) ∧ Pδ(c)2))
ϕ′ = ¬P(δ(b 1) ∧ Pδ(c2))
We have a  ϕ and a  ϕ′.
The correct way of dealing with this is to declare a → b 1 as off. ♦ will ignore it
and P will not be able to traverse it.
We can also in this particular case add the double arrows
(a → b 1)  (b 1 → c2)
Fig. 23 Converting Fig. 22
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as well as
(a → b 1)  (b 1 → c1)
3. Also consider
b 2  ♦δ(c3)
but
b 2  ¬Pδ(c3)
This is already taken care of by (1) above. Had it been the case that b 2 had no
P predecessors, we would have declared b 2 → c3 as off! But this is not needed
here.
The P tests show that if we change P to ♦ or ♦ to P the truth values switch. This
calls for double arrows as discussed in Fig. 23.
Now consider the model in Fig. 23 as a KR model with the relation R1 = ρP ∪ ρ♦
and R2 as drawn. The assignment is the same as in Fig. 21, i.e., points c1, c2, c3 of
Fig. 23 get the same assignment as point c of Fig. 21 and similarly points b 1, b 2 get
the same as b , respectively.
So, when we evaluate a  PA in Fig. 21, we go to point b and activate the double
arrow. When we evaluate a  PA in Fig. 23, we either go to b 1 or go to b 2 and
activate the respective double arrows in each case.
When we go to b 2, the double arrow deactivates b 2 → c3 and so ¬Pδ(c3) holds
but ♦δ(c3) still holds because ♦ ignores the effects of double arrows.
Similarly at b 1 we get the desired results. Thus the models of Figs. 21 and 23 are
equivalent.
Remark 2.10 Note in Definition 2.8 when we define δt (X) for a path
t = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mnxn),
the formula δt (X) does not mention the path t. This will be significant later on, when
we define double arrows using the δt formulas.
To understand what is happening, consider Fig. 20.
Let
t1 = (a,Pe)
t2 = (a,♦b)
we have δt1 = δt2 .
Furthermore, if we consider
t3 = (a,♦c)
we have
a  δt3(♦)
but also
a  δt1(¬♦)
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Definition 2.11
1. Let m = (S, ρ1, ρ2, a, h) be a tree model. Define a relation ≡ on S by letting
• x ≡ y iff ∃z(zρix ∧ zρi y) and i ∈ {1, 2} and if k is the level of x and y then for
all A of less than n − k nested modalities we have x  A iff y  A.
2. let m′ = (S′ ⊆ S, ρ ′2, ρ ′2, a, h) be defined as follows (we call m′ the “reduced
version” of m):
(a) Let a ∈ S′.
(b) Assume x is in S′, let Six be a choice of set of points from S such that
• xρiz for z ∈ Six
• If z, z′ ∈ Six and z = z′ then z ≡ z′.
• If xρiz then for some z′ ∈ Six we have z ≡ z′.
Then let also S1x ∪ S2x ⊆ S′.
Let S′ be the smallest subset of S closed under (a) and (b). Let ρ ′i = ρi  S′.
3. A tree model m is said to be reduced if m = m′.
4. Note that under 2(b) above, we may choose different points, but all possible
models are isomorphic. This is why we speak of “the reuduced model”.
Lemma 2.12 Let m = (S, ρ1, ρ2, a, h) be a tree model and let m′ = (S′, ρ ′1, ρ ′2, a, h) be
its reduced version. Assume a is of level n. Then for any x ∈ S′ of level k and any A
with at most n − k nested modalities we have x  A in m if f a  A in m’.
Proof The proof is by induction on n − k and presents no difficulties. unionsq
Lemma 2.13 Let m be a reduced tree model. Assume our language is based on a f inite
set Q of atoms. Def ine δ(x), x ∈ S by δ(x) = {A | x  A and A is based on Q and
contains at most n − k nested modalities, where k is the level of x}.
Then δ(x) is a system of path nominals.
Proof This follows from the facts that the model is reduced and δ(x) is a complete
theory for the language of up to n − k level formulas. unionsq
Lemma 2.14 Let m = (S, ρ1, ρ2, a, h) be a reduced tree model for a f inite language
based on Q, and let δ(x) be the path nominal system for m as def ined in Lemma 2.13.
Let t ∈ S. Then
δ(t) = εt ∧
∧
π(t)
π(t) (∗)
where εt is a conjuctive form, i.e., ε = ∧q∈Q ±q and where π(t) ranges over all
maximal paths of the form (t, M1x1, . . . , Mnxn) and π is M1(δ(x1) ∧ M2(δ(x3) ∧
. . . ∧ Mnδ(xn) . . .).
Note that π is δπ() as def ined in Def inition 2.8.
Proof By induction on n − k, where k is the level of t
1. The case of n − k = 0 is clear.
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2. The case of n − k = 1 is also clear since any theory of a node x of n − 1 has the
form δ(x) = ε ∧ ∧i ±Pεi ∧
∧
j ±♦ε j.
3. Let t be such that x1, . . . , xm are its ρ1 successors and y1, . . . , yr are its ρ2
successors. We have tρ1x1, . . . , tρ2xm, and tρ2 y1, . . . , tρ2 yr.
First we observe that the theory of node t is equivalent to
At = εt ∧
∧
i
♦δ(xi) ∧
∧
j
Pδ(y j).
Next observe that by the induction hypothesis each δ(z), z ∈ {xi, y j} has the form
δ(z) = εz ∧ ∧η(z) η(z)
= δ(z) ∧ ∧η(z) η(z)
where η(z) ranges over all maximal paths starting at z.
Therefore At has the form
At = εt ∧
∧
z
tρ1z
[♦(δ(z) ∧
∧
η(z)
ψη(z))] ∧
∧
z
tρ2z
[P(δ(z) ∧
∧
η(z)
ψη(z))] (∗1)
We want to rewrite form (8) of Lemma 2.14 in the form (*1) above.
To achieve that let us first write each π = (t, M1z, M2z2, . . .) as π = (t, M1z, η).
Hence
π = M1(δ(z) ∧ η) ()
Second, let us use () and rewrite (*) into two conjuncts:
(∗) = εt ∧
∧
π(t)
π(t) = εt ∧
∧
z, η(z)
tρ1z
♦(δ(z) ∧ η(z)) ∧
∧
z, η(z)
tρ2
P(δ(z) ∧ η(z))
Now since δ is a system of path nominals (see item 1(c) of Remark 2.6): we can
continue and rewrite
= εt ∧
∧
z
tρ1z
♦(δ(z) ∧
∧
η(z)
η(z)) ∧
∧
z
tρ2z
P(δ(z) ∧
∧
η(z)
η(z)) = (∗1)
unionsq
Remark 2.15 Note that the representation of the path nominals in Lemma 2.14 uses
formulas of the positive (in P,♦) form
δπ = M1(δ(x1) ∧ (· · · Mnδ(xn)) . . .).
We do not use ¬M in π . So we do not use formulas of the form
M1(δ(x1) ∧ (. . . (Mn(δ(xn) ∧ ¬Mδ(y)) . . .)
We now want to give definitions and theorems which convert a finite bi-modal
model m into an equivalent finite reactive model m (as in Definition 2.1). We need
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to develop some definitions of path nominals for such models. So we will define the
notions of legitimate paths and path nominals for the models of Definition 2.1.
Definition 2.16 (Legitimate paths) Let m = (S, R1, R2, f, a, h) be a KR model as
in Definition 2.1. We define by induction the notion of a legitimate path t =
(a, M1x1, . . . , Mnxn), where aR1x1 ∧ . . . xn−1 R1xn hold and Mi ∈ {♦,P}, i = 1, . . . , n.
We also define the functions ft, t a legitimate path.
1. (a) is a legitimate path and f(a) = f.
2. Assume that t = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mnxn) is a legitimate path and assume that
f(a,x1,...,xn) has been defined. Let y be such that xn R1 y holds. Then
(a, M1x1, . . . , Mnxn,♦y) is a legitimate path and let ft∗(♦y) = ft.
3. Assume as in (2) that t = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mnxn) is a legitimate path and that
ft has been defined. Let y be such that xn R1 y and that ft(xn, y) = 1. Then
s = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mnxn,Py) is a legitimate path, and let fs = ft[xm, y].
4. A legitimate path is maximal for M if it has the form (a, M1x1, . . . , Mnxn,¬My).
This means that xn is an endpoint, as far as M is concerned.
5. Let Sπ be the set of all legitimate paths of S.
Definition 2.17 (Path nominals for reactive models) Let m = (S, R1, R2, f, a, h) be a
f inite KR model. Let δ be a function defined on Sπ giving for each legitimate path
t = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mnxn) a wff δt of the logic such that the following hold:
1. Let y, z be such that xn R1 y ∧ xn R1z ∧ y = z. Let s1 = t ∗ (My) and s2 = t ∗
(Mz), M ∈ {♦,P}. Then δs1 ∧ δs2 has no reactive model, i.e., it is semantically not
consistent.
2. t  δt in the model mt = (S, R2, R2, ft, t, h).
3. Note that from (1) and (2) above it follows that for ti = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mixi), i =
1, . . . , n we have
a  M1(δt1 ∧ M2(δt2 ∧ (. . . ∧ M(n−1)(δtn−1 ∧ Mn(δtn ∧ A) . . .)
in m = (S, R1, R2, f, a, h) iff t  A in mt = (S, R1, R2, ft, t, h).
In other words, δti act as nominals for the path t.
4. It will be convenient for us in the future to use another function δ∗t associating
with each t a distict atomic formula qt. We can abuse notation and write ‘δ∗t ’ for
‘qt’.
The atoms qt (or δ∗t if we abuse notation) are intended to act as path nominals.
Definition 2.18 Let m = (S, ρ2, ρ2, a, h) be a reduced finite tree model based on a
finite set of atoms. By Lemmas 2.13 and 2.14
δ(t) = εt ∧
∧
π(t)
π(t)
is a path nominal system for m. Let R1 = ρ1 ∪ ρ2. We shall now define a set R2 of
double arrows for m, as well as an activity function f.
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Let t ∈ S and let
π = (t,Px1, M2x2, . . . , Mrxr
)
π ′ = (t,♦x′1, M2x′2, . . . , Mrx′r
)
for r ≥ 1.
Assume for i = 1, . . . , r
δ(xi) = δ
(
x′i
)
We distinguish several cases.
(a) Case 1. For some y such that xrρ2 y (and therefore t  δπ(Pδ(y))) we have t 
δπ ′(¬Pδ(y)).
In this case introduce the double arrow (t → x1)  (xr → y) into R2.
(b) Case 2. uρ1ν holds.
In this case let f(u → ν) = 0.
So all ρ1 arrows are off.
(c) Note following Case 2. Note that since Case 1 introduces double arrows only
to ρ2 connections, the function f does not change its ‘off’ value on all ρ1
connections!
Consider now the model m = (S, R1, R2, f, a, h). Call this model the reactive
conversion of m. In this model we read P and ♦ as in Definition 2.2.
Remark 2.19
1. Part 1. The question. Consider model m of Definition 2.18 and its reactive
conversion m. Take a t ∈ S of level k and a wff A of at most n − k nested
modalities.
Question. Do we have (1) below?
(1) t  A in m iff t  A in m.
To be able to prove that we need some properties (axioms) of ♦,P which will
manifest themselves as properties of R2. With the right axioms (1) might hold.
Let us examine (1) more closely. It is clear immediately that (1) is not
properly formualted. The model m is a reactive model and so we cannot ask
for t ∈ S the simple question, does t  A in m, we need to know the legitimate
path leading to t. So let
t = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mrxr)
where xr = t. We ask does (2) hold?
(2) t  A in m iff t  A in m.
Note that the question is not simple. Consider Fig. 24 describing a model m
(we are not showing h):
The model m has two maximal paths
a
P−→ b P−→ c
and
a
♦−→ d .
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Fig. 24 Sample model
When we convert it to the model m (we need to know the assignment h to
convert and define R2 and f, but let us ignore that) we may get new paths,
such as
a
♦−→ b P−→ c
a
♦−→ b ♦−→ c
a
P−→ b ♦−→ c
and
a
P−→ d.
An examination of Case 2 of Definition 2.18 indicates that a
P−→ d is not
allowed but the other paths are allowed.
2. Part 2. The answer. What we need to show then are two items
item (a) The double arrows in m behave correctly.
item (b) The new paths obtained by allowing ♦ to traverse P connections for
example, from t to s, (i.e., t
P−→ s), do not change the value of δ(t)
at points t. Only the old paths (those already in m) do count for the
value of δ(t).
Let us elaborate more on (item a) and (item b).
We start with (item a):
Let π = (a, M1x1, . . . ,Px j, . . . , Mrxr) be a fixed path which has P at the j
position as indicated.
Let π ′j = (a, M1x1, . . . ,♦x j, . . . , Mrxr).
Let xrρ2 y hold.
Assume in the model m we have a  δπ(Pδ(y)).
Let Pπ be the set of all j in{1, . . . , r} such that π has P in the j position.
Let I, J ⊆ Pπ be two disjoint sets such that I ∪ J = Pπ and
(a) j ∈ J → a  δ
π ′j
(¬Pδ(y))
(b) j ∈ I ⇒ a  δ
π ′j
(Pδ(y)).
Then the number of elements in J is even.
Completeness theorems for reactive modal logics 111
This calls for the following axiom:
rπ (Pδ(y) ∧
∧
j∈J
δπ ′j
(¬Pδ(y)) ∧
∧
j∈I
δπ ′j
(Pδ(y)) → ⊥ (A)
for any π = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mrxr) and where xrρ2 y holds and Pπ and I, J are
defined as above, and J has an odd number of elements.
The reason that J must be even is that if we traverse the path from a to t and
trigger all double arrows as defined in Case 1 of Definition 2.18 then when we
get to xr we still have xr  Pδy) (since xrρ2 y holds). So the double arrows must
cancel each other, so J must be even.
In fact, the situation is much more complex than that as we shall now analyse.
3. Part 3. The axiom. Let t ∈ S. Let π = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mrxr) be the unique path
in m leading up to xr. Let π∗ = (a, M∗1 x1, . . . , M∗r xr) be a legitimate path in m
leading to xr such that π∗ is obtained from π by changing some P into ♦.
Assume that xr
P−→ y in m. We want to make sure that fπ∗(xr → y) = 1 in m.
Figure 25 shows what we need to worry about
Fig. 25 Illustrating a challenge for our axioms
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The path π in m contains x1
P−→ x2. This connection sends a double arrow to
xr
P−→ y and also to xi P−→ xi+1. If π∗ goes through x1 P−→ x2 in m by using
possible ♦, (i.e., ♦x2 ∈ π∗), then the double arrows
(x1) → x2)  (xi → xi+1)
and
(x1 → x2)  (xr → y)
are not activated and no signal is sent to the arc xr
P−→ y. So there are several
possibilities of what can happen in m.
(a) xi → xi+1 gets ‘hit’ by an odd number of active double arrows which were
activated by π∗ on its way to xi, and is not active in m and therefore the
only way that π∗ gets through to xr is because it uses xi
♦−→ xi+1, (i.e.,
♦xi+1 is in π∗).
(b) xi
P−→ xi+1 is active in m (receives an even number of double arrows)
and π gets through xi → xi+1 either as ♦ or as P.
(c) Depending on how π∗ passes through xi → xi+1 we will know whether
the double arrow
(xi → xi+1)  (xr → y)
is activated in m or not and so whether xr
P−→ y is ‘hit’ by it.
We need to show that the net effects in m of all double arrows received by
xr → y from any active and P-traversed xi → xi+1 in π∗ is that their number is
even and therefore xr → y is active in m∗. We need to write an axiom to ensure
that outcome.
We need some notation:
(a) Given a path π = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mrxr,Py) let
π(i, j) = (xi, Mi+1xi+1, . . . , Mjx j)
δπ(i, j)(Pδ(x j+1)) = (P(δ(xi+1) ∧ Mi+2(δ(xi+2 ∧ . . . Mj(δ(x j) ∧ Pδ(x j+1) . . .)
∗δπ(i, j)(¬Pδ(x j+1)) = (♦(δ(xi+1) ∧ Mi+2(δ(xi+2) ∧ . . .
∧Mj(δ(x j) ∧ ¬Pδ(x j+1) . . .)
Let Eπ be all (i, j) such that 1 ≤ i < k, 1 < j ≤ k and there exists a
double arrow (xi → xi+1)  (x j → x j+1). This means that in m we have
xi  αi, j(π,π∗) where
αi, j(π,π∗) = δπ(i, j)(Pδ(x j+1)) ∧ ∗δπ(i, j)(¬Pδ(x j+1))
Let πi = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mixi). Then we have xi  αi, j(π,π ′) iff a 
δπi(αi, j(π,π ′)).
Let π∗ = (a, M∗1 x1 . . . M∗r xr,Py).
Let Dπ
∗π be the set of all i such that xi
P−→ xi+1 is in both π and in π∗.
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Define the predicate Active (xs → ss+1, π, π∗) by
• Active((x1 → x2), π, π∗)
• Active((xs+1 → xs+2), π, π∗) iff the set {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ s and Active((xi →
xi+1), π, π∗) and (i, s) ∈ Eπ and i ∈ Dπ,π∗ } has an even number of
elements.
To write an axiom RA expressing what is needed (RA for reactive axiom)
we need to translate the predicate Active(xs → xs+1) into logic. This we
do as follows: “Active” translates “Active”
• Active((x1 → x2), π, π∗) = 
• Active((xs+1 → xs+2), π, π∗) =∧
1 ≤ i ≤ s
i ∈ Dπ,π∗
(i, s) ∈ Eπ
[
Active((xi → xi+1), π, π∗) ∧ δπi(αi,s(π, π∗))
]
.
If the set {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ s, such that δ(a)  Active((xi → xi+1), π, π∗) in
m and (i, s) ∈ Eπ and i ∈ Dπ,π∗ } has an even number of elements
and
= Active((xs → xs+1), π, π∗) = ⊥ otherwise.
Where in classical logic ‘the set of the true propositions {a1, . . . , ak}
has an even number of elements’ can be written as
[(. . . (¬a1 → ¬a2) → ¬a3) → . . .) → ¬an)]
The axiom RA is
RA =
∧
π∗,π
[
δπ(P(δ(y)) → Active((xr → y), π, π∗)
]
Note that there is a restriction on π∗ that it only allowed to change some Pxi
in π into a ♦xi in π∗.
Note that the axiom RA was defined using satisfaction in the model m through
its system δ of path nominals. To write a syntactic axiom for the completeness
proof we need to use variables for the syntactical description of m and define
δ syntactically. Let μm, δm be the wffs doing this job. Then μ → RA(μ) is an
axiom for each μ. This is done in Section 3.
This will give us an infinite set of axioms for each syntactical finite tree with
two successor functions.
4. Part 4. Completeness. To explain (item b), consider Fig. 26
Figure 26 describes the situation in model m. In this model we have t  Pδ(s2)
and t  ♦δ(s1). If in m we allow ♦ to traverse also t P−→ s2, we may have a
problem. Maybe we have that t  ¬♦δ(s2) holds in m but if we allow ♦ to get
to s2 we will we get a contradiction? The answer is that we need not worry.
In m, when we go to s2 from t we trigger some double arrows and so we can
prove that in m s2  δ(s2) (i.e., the model changes). We also show that if there
are no double arrows emanating from t
P−→ s2, then t  ¬♦δ(s2) cannot be
the case.
As for traversing t
P−→ s1 in m, this has been forbidden by Case 2 of
Definition 2.18.
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Fig. 26 Explaining our axioms
We are now ready to state and prove our main lemma.
Lemma 2.20 Let m and m be two models as in Remark 2.19 and assume that m
satisf ies axiom RA of this remark.
Then the following condition () holds for any path π = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mrxr) in m
and path π∗ in m
π∗ = (a, M∗1 x1, . . . , M∗r xr
)
where π and π∗ are related by the condition : M∗i = P ⇒ Mi = P.
() xr  δ(xr) in m if f xr  δ(xr) in mπ∗ = (S, R1, R2, fπ∗ , a, h)
where fπ∗ = f[a, x1][x1, x2] . . . [xr−1, xr], as def ined in Def inition 2.1.
Proof By induction on the level n − r, where n is the level of a.
Case (n − r) = 0
In this case δ(xr) is a classical model (i.e., ε is a conjunctive normal form of atoms
from Q) and so () holds.
Case (n − r) = 1
In this case δ(xr) has the form
ε ∧
∧
i
(♦εi ∧ Pεi) ∧
∧
j
♦(η j ∧ ¬Pη j)
where εi and η j are classical models.
The same holds in m because PA → ♦A holds for A not containing P and in m
all arrows of the form u
♦−→ v are off.
See Case 2 of Definition 2.18 and the note there following Case 2.
Case (n − r) > 1
The cases to check are those of ♦ and P.
Subcase of ♦ Let xrρ1 y hold in m. Then xr  ♦δ(y) in m. Hence y  δ(y) in m and
by the induction hypothesis, y  δ(y) in m
(π∗,♦y).
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Since in m we have xr R1 y, we also get that xr  ♦δ(y) in mπ∗ .
Assume now that xrρ2z holds in m and that xr  ¬♦δ(z) in m and of course xr 
Pδ(z) in m. Look at xr from the point of view of m

π∗ ; we see that xr R1z holds and
therefore we have to ensure that we do not have that δ(z) holds at z in m
(π∗,♦z).
Note that the models m
(π∗,♦z) and m

(π∗,Pz) may not be the same because in the
model m
(π∗,Pz) the activity function is fπ∗ [xr, z], while in the model m(π∗♦z) the activity
function if fπ∗ . We know by the induction hypothesis that in the model m

(π∗,Pz) we do
have that z  δ(z).
The question is does z  δ(z) hold in m
(π∗,♦z)? We want it not to hold.
This we now proceed to prove. We consider two possibilities for the arc xr
P−→ z.
Possiblity 1 There is at least one double arrow emanating from xr
P−→ z into the
model m
(π∗,Pz). This means that for some (M1w1, . . . , Msws) we have sρ1 y and
δ
(xr,Pz,M1w1,...,Msws)
(Pδ(y)) holds at xr while δ(xr,♦z,M1w1,...,Msws)(¬Pδ(y)) also holds
at xr.
We can assume that there is no double arrow of the form (xr → z) → (wi → wi+1)
for i < s. This ensures that s is minimal and we don’t have to worry about other
double arrow changes along the way from xr to s!
This means by Definition 2.18 that (x → z)  (ws → y) ∈ R2.
We now consider δ(xr). According to Lemma 2.14, we have that
δ(xr)  ♦δ(M1w1,...,Msws)(¬Pδ(y))
because
xr  δ(xr,♦z,M1w1,...,Msws)(¬Pδ(u))
in m. Thus δ(z)  δ(M1w1,...,Msws)(¬Pδ(y)).
On the other hand in the model m
(π,♦z) we have that z  δ(M1w1,...,Msws)(Pδ(y))
because the double arrow from (xr → z) to ws → y is ignored by ♦.
Therefore in the model mπ∗ we do not have xr  ♦δ(z).
Possiblity 2 No double arrows emanate from xr → z. In this case for
all (M1w1, . . . , Msws) xr  (xr,Pz,M1w1,...,Msws)(Pδ(y)) in m iff in m also
xr  (xr♦z,M1w1,...,Msws)(Pδ(y)).
But this means that at xr,♦δ(z) = Pδ(z) in m so xr  ♦δ(z) (see Remark 2.15)
contrary to our assumption.
Subcase of P We now examine the case of P. Assume xrρ1z and assume xr  ¬Pδ(z)
in m. This means that for all y such that xrρ2 y we have y  ¬δ(z) in m. Hence by the
induction hypothesis, y  ¬δ(z) in m
(π∗,Py). Hence we have that in m

π∗ , xr  ¬Pδ(z).
The reason for the last step is that any y such that xrρ1 y is not accessible for P, i.e.,
such an arc xr
♦−→ y is off in m.
Now assume xrρ2z in m. Then xr  Pδ(z) holds in m. Hence z  δ(z) holds in m.
By the induction hypothesis, z  δ(z) holds in m
(π∗,Pz). If the connection xr
P−→ z is
on in mπ∗ , (i.e., fπ∗(xr
P−→ z) = 1) then we will get that in mπ∗ , xr  Pδ(z).
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How can it be the case that fπ∗(xr → z) = 0? This can happen if along the path
π = (a, M1x1, . . . , Mrxr) an odd number of double arrows was triggered towards the
arc xr → z. To see what this means we go to Case 1 of Definition 2.18. But then let
us also consider Remark 2.19 and axiom RA. We will be in violation of axiom RA if
an odd number of double arrows hits xr → z. The axiom says that xr → z must be
active. This completes the induction case and the Lemma is proved. unionsq
We now have almost all that we need for the completeness proof. We basically
take axiom RA and construct a Henkin type reduced model m, convert it to m and
use Lemma 2.20.
This we shall do in the next Section 3.
3 Completeness theorem for KR
This section provides an axiom system and a completeness theorem for the logic KR
as defined semantically in Definition 2.1. Our strategy is as follows:
Given a formula A, we want to construct a model for it. A has a finite number of
atoms and no more than n nested modalities, and so we expect to construct a finite
model of level n with an assignment to the atoms of A. We need to find the right
axioms which will enable us to carry out the construction of the correct model.
We begin by syntactically defining all finite models. This is done in Definition 3.1.
We also define syntactically a natural system of path nominals for each model and
using it we can talk syntactically about paths π and their associated paths π∗.
Armed with this syntactical capability, we can write Axiom 3 of Definition 3.4. The
formulation of this axiom was discussed at length on page 35 in part 3 of Remark 2.19.
We mention that this axiomatisation is brute force (see discussion below in
Remark 3.7), we cannot get around it without possibly adding more connectives.
The reader should note that there is a difference of culture here between the
pure mathematical logician and the applied logician. The pure logician would tend
to axiomatise with minimum number of connectives and minimum number of
variables used. The Polish school of logic, for example, is well known for its minimal
axiomatisations of classical logic and its variants, an ongoing activity which was
slowed down only by the Second World War.
The applied logician would be more inclined to add connectives and constants as
long as they have a natural meaning in the application area. We shall address this
possibility in the concluding section.
3.1 Methodological presentation of the axioms for KR
Definition 3.1 (Syntactical models) Let Q = {q1, . . . , qk} be a set of atoms and let S
be an infinite set of names of possible worlds. We shall define inductively the family
of all n-level syntactical models together with their possible world realisation and a
path nominal function δ for each such model.
1. Any conjunctive normal form of the form
μ0 = ε =
∧
q∈Q
±q
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is a syntactical level 0 model. Fore each such ε let nε = ({tε, h) be a corresponding
level 0 model, with tε ∈ S and h(tε, q) = 1 iff ε  q. Assume ε = ε′ ⇒ tε = tε′ . Let
δ(tε) = ε.
2. The syntactical models of level 1 have the form
μ = μ1 = ε1 ∧
∧
ε∈I
♦ε ∧
∧
η∈J
Pη ∧
∧
ε ∈I
¬♦ε ∧
∧
η ∈J
¬Pη
where ε1 is a level 0 syntactical model and ε, η range over level 0 syntactical
models and J, I are the sets of level 0 syntactical models.
The corresponding level 1 reduced model realisation of μ1 is defined as follows
nμ = (Sμ, ρ1, ρ2, aμ, h)
where
Sμ = {aμ} ∪ {tε | ε ∈ I} ∪ {sε | ε ∈ J}.
We assume aμ, tε, sε are all different elements of S.
We let aμρ1tε, ε ∈ I and aμρ2sε, ε ∈ J.
Let
h(a, q) = 1 iff ε1  q
h(tε, q) = 1 iff ε  q
h(sε, q) = 1 iff ε  q
Let
δ(tε) = ε
δ(sε) = ε
δ(aμ) = μ
3. Assume the syntactical models are defined for any level ≤ m. Also assume that
for any such syntactical model μ a realisation model nμ = (Sμ, ρ1, ρ2, aμ, h) is
also defined with
μ1 = μ2 ⇒ Sμ1 ∩ Sμ2 = 
Let I, J be any sets of syntactical models of level ≤ m. Assume at least one model
in I ∪ J is of level m and not of any level < m.
Define the level m + 1 model μ as follows
μ = εμ ∧
∧
α∈I
♦α ∧
∧
β∈J
Pβ ∧
∧
α ∈I
¬♦α ∧
∧
β ∈J
¬Pβ .
Define the level m + 1 realisation model for μ as follows:
nμ = (Sμ, ρ1, ρ2, aμ, h).
For each α ∈ I, β ∈ J let nα = (Siα, ρα1 , ρα2 , aα, hα) and nβ = (SJβ, ρβ1 , ρβ2 , aβ, hβ)
be their respective realisation models. Assume all SIα, S
J
β are pairwise disjoint.
Also assume δα, δβ are given on nα, nβ . Let Sμ = {aμ} ∪ ⋃α∈I SIα ∪
⋃
β∈J S
J
β where
aμ is a new label from S.
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Define
aμρ1aα, α ∈ I
aμρ2aβ, β ∈ J
ρi, i = 1, 2 is the same as ραi on SIα , for α ∈ I and ρi be the same as ρ Jβ for β ∈ J.
Let h(aμ, q) = 1 iff εμ  q and let h be hα on SIα and hβ on SJβ .
Let δμ be δα on SIα, δβ on S
J
β and let δ(aμ) = μ.
Lemma 3.2 Let μ be a syntactical model and let nμ be its realisation as def ined in
Def inition 3.1. Let δμ be its path nominal system as def ined in Def inition 3.1.
Then δμ is indeed a path nominal function according to Def inition 2.4 and
Lemma 2.14 holds for δμ.
Proof Simple, by induction. unionsq
Lemma 3.3 Let m = (S, ρ1, ρ2, a, h) be a reduced model of level n for Q. Let μ be
a syntactical model for Q. Assume that a  μ. Let nμ be the realisation model for μ.
Then m is isomorphic with nμ.
Proof By induction on the level of m. unionsq
Definition 3.4 (Axiom system for KR) Consider the following axioms for KR.
1. Modal K axioms and rules for P and ♦.
2. PA → ♦A for A not containing P.
3. For each syntactical model μ, let RA(μ) be the axiom as defined on page 35 in
Part 3 of Remark 2.19. Then our axiom is μ → RA(μ).
Remark 3.5 Note that by axiom (2) Pq → ♦q is a theorem for atomic q. Thus μ =
q ∧ Pq ∧ ¬♦q is an inconsistent level 1 syntactical model for {q}. This does not affect
Axiom 3 because μ is in the antecedent!
Remark 3.6 Let us comment on Axiom 2 of our logic:
1. If A is a wff without , then PA → ♦A. This is not true for arbitrary A. Consider
Fig. 27.
In this figure, s → r is off, so ♦Pq is false at t, however, PPq is the true at t,
because the double arrow (t → s)  (s → r) is triggered by P and so it activates the
connection s → r and hence s  Pq.
Remark 3.7 The perceptive reader will have noticed that our axiomatisation of KR
is a ‘brute-force’ axiom system. Our ‘axioms’ simply describe syntactically the correct
semantics. Perhaps the reader would have expected a nicer axiom system. This is not
possible. We shall offer an explanation by giving an example.
Consider ordinary modal logic K with a single modality ♦. Its models have
the form (S, R, a), a ∈ S, R ⊆ S × S and R is not necessarily reflexive. The truth
condition for ♦ is (1).
1. t  ♦A iff for some s, tRs and s  A.
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Fig. 27 Illustrating Remark 3.6
Let us now change the semantics a bit. Consider models of the form (S, E, R, a),
with E ⊆ S. We change the truth condition to be
2.
t  ♦A iff
⎧
⎨
⎩
t ∈ E and for some s, tRs and s  A
and
t ∈ E and t  A or for some s, tRs and s  A
Thus the set E tells us that we want reflexivity.
Now define a family of finite models (S, E, R, a, h) as follows.
Take any finite model m = (S, R, a, h). Code this model by a Turing machine.
Apply an effective procedure to extract a set Em ⊆ S, and define the new model
n = (S, Em, R, a, h).
Let the logic KR be defined by the set of all such model n.
Now I ask the reader how can you axiomatise this logic without syntatically
describing the models n?
If the definition of n is simple we can probably do it nicely but otherwise brute-
force is needed.
For example, we can let
t ∈ E iff ∃x(xRt ∧ ¬xRx).
Then maybe we can axiomatise this logic nicely.
In the case of KR we allow double arrows to go anywhere and we can switch
connections on and off. This is too free to control nicely, so brute-force is called for.
Our difficulty is compounded by the fact that we do not have any modality or other
special connective controlling the double arrows, so our only means to describe their
behaviour is through the coding of the changes they cause in the model, hence the
need for a brute force axiomatisation.
Here are some simple conditions on reactivity which can make for nicer logics.
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Fig. 28 Next step reactivity
Next step reactivity If (x → y)  (w → z) ∈ R2 then y = w. I.e. we are allowed
double arrows only in the form of Fig. 28
Forward look reactivity The target of the next arrow must be above the target of a
previous arrow. Namely if
(x → y)  (u → v) ∈ R2
and
(x′ → y)  (u′ → v′) ∈ R2
and for some m ≥ 1
xρmx′
Then for some n
uρnu′
In words: a later arrow must ‘hit’ a later target.
Figure 29 illustrates the idea.
3.2 The canonical model
We now construct a canonical finite reduced model for two modalities P and ♦ and
then covert it to a KR model. We shall construct a finite model for any consistent
formula A. This will also give us finite model property and decidability.
Our starting point is to construct a very specific bi-modal finite model with two
accessibility relations, one for  and the other for . Additional axioms will allow us
to convert this special model into a reactive one.
We need some definitions.
1. A wff A is said to be of level n if n is the maximal number of nested {P,♦} in A.
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Fig. 29 A later arrow ‘hit’ a later target
2. Let Q = {q1, . . . , qk} be a set of atoms, then let Qn be the set of all wffs based on
Q of level ≤ n.
Let A be a consistent wff. We want to construct a finite model for A. Let q1, . . . , qk
be all atomic sentences appearing in A and let n be the maximal number of nested
modal operators {P,♦} in A.
Step 1 We first extend A to a theory  containing A satisfying the following
conditions
1. For any wff B built up from {q1, . . . , qk} and containing no more than n nested
modalities we have B ∈  or ¬B ∈ 
2.  is KR consistent. We shall construct a finite model for .
Step 2a Let PD ∈ .
We say ED of level ≤ n − 1 is maximal for PD ∈ , iff P(D ∧ ED) ∈  and
whenever Px ∈  and X is of level ≤ n − 1 and  D ∧ ED. We also have
D ∧ ED  X.
We now show that such an ED exists.
Lemma 3.8 Let PY ∈  and let X be any wf f of level ≤ n − 2. Then either P(Y ∧
X) ∈  or P(Y ∧ ¬X) ∈ .
Proof If neither is in  then ¬P(Y ∧ X) ∧ ¬P(Y ∧ ¬X) is in . Therefore
(Y → ¬X) ∧ (Y → X) ∈ 
and hence ¬Y ∈  contradicting the consistency of . unionsq
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From the lemma it follows that we can add inductively ±Xm+1 to P(Y ∧ ±x1 ∧
. . . ∧ ±xm) and hence such a maximal ED exists for any PD ∈ .
This is so because assume we added Yi such that P(Y ∧ ∧ Yi) ∈  and for every
Z of level ≤ n − 1, there exists an i such that Yi = Z or Yi = ¬Z .
Now assume PU ∈  and U  Y ∧ ∧ Yi.
Since u is of level ≤ n − 1 then for some Yi, either Yi = U or Yi = ¬U . If Yi = U
then Y ∧ ∧i Yi  U as required.
If Yi = ¬U then we get that U  ¬U , i.e., U  ⊥ and so P⊥ ∈ . This is not
possible.
Let P(Di ∧ EiD) ∈  be the entire list of all such maximal wffs, i = 1, . . . , rn. Note
that the index ‘n’ in ‘rn’ is the level n of the theory . In the sequel we shall use
theories of level n − m, m = 1, 2, . . . and we shall respectively use rn−m, m = 1, 2 . . ..
Similarly we shall introduce below sn, sn−1 . . .
Step 2b Similarly suppose we have that ♦B ∈ , then there exists a maximal EB
such that ♦(B ∧ EB) ∈ .
We need another lemma.
Lemma 3.9 Let ♦B ∈  and let x be any wf f of level ≤ n − 1. Then either ♦(B ∧ X) ∈
 or ♦(B ∧ ¬X) ∈ . Otherwise
¬♦(B ∧ X) ∧ ¬♦(B ∧ ¬X ∈ 
hence (B → X) ∧ (B → ¬X) ∈  and hence ¬B ∈  contradicting the consis-
tency of .
We can thus let ♦(B j ∧ EB j) ∈  enumerate all the wffs of this form which are
maximal and are in , for j = rn + 1, . . . , rn + sn.
Lemma 3.10 If ♦X ∈  and ♦Y ∈  and X and Y are maximal then either X ≡ Y or
(X  Y and Y  X).
Proof If Y  X then X and Y are consistent. We get by maximality of X that X  Y,
hence X ≡ Y. Similarly for PX,PY.
The above two step considerations proved the following. unionsq
Lemma 3.11 Let Q be f inite and let  be any complete theory of the language Qn.
Then there exists Dn−11 , . . . , D
n−1
rn , B
n−1
rn+1, . . . , B
n−1
rn+sn of level ≤ n − 1 such that the
following holds
1. PDn−1i ∈ , i = 1 . . . rn
2. ♦Bn−1j ∈ , j = r + n + 1, . . . , rn + sn
(a) PCa−1k ∧ ♦Cn−1k ∈ , sn + 1 ≤ k ≤ wn
3. For any D such that D ∈ , there exists an i such that Dn−1i  D.
4. For any B such that ♦B ∈ , there exists a j such that Bn−1j  B.
5. For any two non equivalent Y, X ∈ {Dn−1i , Bn−1j } we have Y  X and X  Y.
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Step 3 Consider the situation of Lemma 3.11.
1. For each PDni ∈  let n−1i = {Dn−1i } ∪ {| U of level ≤ n − 1 and ∅U ∈ }. This
set is consistent and can be extended to a complete theory n−1i in the language
Q
n−1.
2. Similarly for any ♦Bn−1j ∈  we let n−1j = {Bn−1j } ∪ {U | U of level ≤ n − 1 and
U ∈ }.
This set is consistent and can be extended to a complete and consistent theory
n−1j of Q
n−1.
Step 4 We start with a complete and consistent theory  of Qn and construct a finite
tree model for it as follows. (S, R, ρ♦, ρP) is the tree. We first define S and R in steps.
Construction step 4.0 Let 0 ∈ S and let 0 = .
Construction step 4.1 Consider the situation described in Lemma 3.11 for . Let
(0, i), i = 1, . . . , rn + 1 be new elements which we put into S and let
(0,i) = n−1i , i = 1, . . . , rn
(0, j) = n−1j , j = rn + 1, . . . , rn + sn
Construction step 4.m for 1 < m ≤ n Assume S contains a sequence t =
(0, x1, . . . , xm) and that a theory n−m = n−m(0,x1,...,xm) has been defined.
We repeat the construction of step 1 for the theory n−m using the indices rn−m
and sn−m and define respective sequences
t ∗ (i), i = 1, . . . , rn−m
and
t ∗ ( j),= rn−m + 1, . . . , rn−m + sn−m
and put them in S. We also define theories n−m−1t∗(i) and 
n−m−1
t∗( j) using 
n−m
i and 
n−m
j
respectively as done in Step 4.1.
The construction stops at m = n − 1. We get a set S of sequences t ∈ S. The set
forms a tree under the relation tRs iff ∃x(s = t ∗ (x)). With each t of length m we
have a theory n−mt .
For t = (0, x1, . . . , xm) let tρPs hold when s = t ∗ (i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ rn−m (i.e. s was
created because of P ∗ Dn−mi in n−mt ). tρ♦s iff s = t ∗ ( j) for rn−m + 1 ≤ j ≤ sn−m
(i.e., s was created because of ♦Bn−mj ∈ ).
Define an assignment h as follows: t  q iff q ∈ t.
Lemma 3.12 In the model (S, R, ρ♦, ρP, a, h) we have for any wf f of level ≤ n − m
and any t of length m
t  A if f A ∈ t.
Proof By induction on A
For atoms this holds.
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Consider the case of PA.
1. Assume PA ∈ n−mt . Then for some Dn−m−1i we have Dn−m−1i  A and
PDn−m−1i ∈ n−mt . Hence Dn−m−1i ∈ n−m−1t∗(i) . By the induction hypothesis t ∗ (i) 
Dn−m−1i and therefore t ∗ (i)  A.
2. Assume A ∈ n−mt . Then by construction for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ rn−m we have A ∈
n−m−1t∗(i) and so t ∗ (i)  A, and hence t  A.
The proof for ♦ is similar. unionsq
We have proved weak completeness for the logic with ♦ and P using the axioms
of K for each.
We got R = ρ♦ ∪ ρP and we need to covert this model to a model of KR with R1
and R2.
We now need to use our additional axioms RA to determine how ρP is correctly
derived from a set of double arrows R2.
Remark 3.13 We make some observations about the model (S, R, ρ♦, ρP, 0, h) which
we constructed.
Let tm = (0, x1, . . . , xm) be a point in the tree. Let ti = (0, x1, . . . , xi), i ≤ m. We
know ti+1 = ti ∗ (xi+1).
1. If xi+1 ≤ ri then PDn−i−1xi ∈ n−1ti and Dn−i−1xi ∈ n−i−1ti+1 . We write xi
P−→ xi+1.
2. If ri < xi+1 ≤ si then ♦Bn−i−1xi ∈ n−iti and B−i−1xi ∈ n−i−1ti+1 . We write xi
♦−→ xi+1.
Let Exi be the key formula D
n−i−1
xi or B
n−i−1
xi as the case may be. Then clearly at
n0 the following holds
βtm = M1(Ex1 ∧ Mw(Ex2 ∧ . . . Mm−1(Exm−1 ∧ Mm Exm) . . .)
where Mi ∈ {P,♦) and Mi = P if ≤ xi ≤ ri and Mi = ♦ if ri + 1 ≤ xi ≤ si.
We write xi
Mi−→ xi+1.
Clearly by the completeness theorem Lemma 3.12, we also have 0  βtm .
Following Lemma 3.10 βtm uniquely characterises the path leading to tm in the
model. Therefore δ∗x = Ex, as defined in Lemma 3.11, can act as path nominals for
the points t via their validity at 0.
Theorem 3.14 (Completeness theorem for KR) KR of Def inition 3.4 is complete for
the proposed semantics of Def inition 2.1.
Proof Let A be a consistent formula. We constructed reduced finite bi-modal model
m for A as in Section 3.2. By Lemma 3.12, A holds in this model. By Remark 2.19
and Lemma 2.20, m can be converted to a KR model in which A holds. unionsq
Theorem 3.15 (Decidability ad finite model property) KR has the f inite model
property and is decidable.
Proof From Theorem 3.14. unionsq
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4 Concluding remarks
We saw that reactive models are very useful and the idea of reactivity is applicable in
many areas. The basic system KR of modal reactivity turned out to be not so easily
axiomatisable and this calls for possibly some simplifying assumptions on the reactive
double arrows, possibly emerging from applications.
So this is one direction of future research.
Another direction is to look at some of the new additional modal connectives and
use them to introduce reactivity. We chose ♦ and P, where ♦ ignores reactivity and
P uses it. This is the most direct and natural connective. However, we can approach
reactivity ‘sideways’ as can be seen from Fig. 30.
Since our models are trees, the node xi+1 completely identifies the arc xi → xi+1.
Similarly, the node v completely identifies u → v. Thus if we add a new binary
relation R3 on S with vR3x reading
• There is a double arrow of the form ((predecessor of x) → x)  ((predecessor
of v) → v)
We can map all double arrows this way.
So in a reactive model, R2 can be represented by R3. So we can have a new
modality say ♦′ for double arrows. We can add a special proposition on and have
v  ♦′on iff ∃x(vR3x ∧ x  on)
Fig. 30 Reducing reactivity to modality in case of trees
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This device may give us some scope for simplifying the axiomatisation but we still
need to represent the switch nature of the double arrows. We still have to count how
many ‘hits’ v receives, and it is this part which makes the axiomatisation complicated.
We invite the reader to use the classical translation of modal logic into classical
logic. In classical logic we have the full power of the classical quantifiers and still it is
not simple to express that {y | xR3 y} is odd.
Furthermore, ♦ can ignore the double arrows and so we need to count the ‘hits’
from arcs not ignored by ♦. ‘Ignored by ♦’ implies ‘motion’ along the arcs and this is
foreign to traditional modal logic or to classical logic.
My guess is that axiomatising with the aid of ♦′ or any additional tricks would still
be very complicated.
Of course good restrictions on the reactivity can simplify the system considerably,
and with good luck the simplified system may still be interesting and applicable. One
such restriction is the next step reactivity, mentioned in Remark 3.7.
Proposition 4.1 Any next step reactivity logic system is equivalent to a bi-modal system
with one modality implying the other!
Proof Figure 31 explains the idea of the proof.
So that is simple enough! It is also still more powerful. Theorem 1.2 still holds. unionsq
So we need to find good conditions on R1 and R2 of the semantics! Indeed, there
is still lots to be done.
Remark 4.2 The idea of modality ♦′ and its corresponding relation R3 has other
unexpected consequences. Consider the situation in Fig. 32. This is an interesting
situation where we have a higher level double arrow of the form (b → c) 
((a → b)  (c → d).
Fig. 31 Illustrating the idea of Proposition 4.1
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R 1
d
c
b
a
R 1
R 1
Fig. 32 Higher level double arrow
If we use the relation R3 and the modality ♦′, we get the situation in Fig. 33. Now
we have a situation with ordinary double arrows, so we can use a new relation R4 and
a modality ♦′′ to eliminate all double arrows, as in Fig. 34.
R 3
d
c
b
a
R 1
R 1
R 1
Fig. 33 Reducing Fig. 32
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R 4
d
c
b
a
R 1
R 1
R 1
R 3
Fig. 34 Reducing Fig. 33
We must remember that yR4x indicates double arrows from the arc ((the R1
predecessors of x) → x) to the arc ((the R3 predecessor of y) → y). So when we
have many relations R, a better notation would be as follows:
Use RR1,R1 instead of R3.
Use R(R1(R1,R1)) instead of R4.
The conclusion from this example is that higher level double arrows can be
reduced to multiple modalities. Looking at it the other way round, (in the spirit of
Proposition 4.1) multimodal logic can be reduced (given the right conditions) to a
higher level reactive modal logic with one modality.
These investigations we postpone for later.
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